Socioeconomic Status and Medical Care Expenditures in Medicare Managed Care by Kanika Kapur et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND MEDICAL CARE













This  research  was  supported  by  grants  RO1-HS/AG09630  and  PO1-HS10770  from  the  Agency  for
Healthcare Research and Quality  The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and not necessarily
those of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
©2004 by Kanika Kapur, Jeannette A. Rogowski, Vicki A. Freedman, Steven L. Wickstrom, John L. Adams,
and José J. Escarce. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted
without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Socioeconomic Status and Medical Care Expenditures in Medicare Managed Care
Kanika Kapur, Jeannette A. Rogowski, Vicki A. Freedman, Steven L. Wickstrom, John L.
Adams, and José J. Escarce
NBER Working Paper No. 10757
September 2004
JEL No.  I1
ABSTRACT
This study examined the effects of education, income, and wealth on medical care expenditures in
two Medicare managed care plans. The study also sought to elucidate the pathways through which
socioeconomic status (SES) affects expenditures, including preferences for health and medical care
and ability to navigate the managed care system. We modeled the effect of SES on medical care
expenditures using Generalized Linear Models, estimating separate models for each component of
medical expenditures: inpatient, outpatient, physician, and other expenditures. We found that
education, income, and wealth all affected medical care expenditures, although the effects of these
variables differed across expenditure categories. Moreover, the effects of these SES variables were
much smaller than the effects found in earlier studies of fee-for-service Medicare. The pathway
variables also were associated with expenditures. Accounting for the pathways through which SES
affects expenditures narrowed the effect of SES on expenditures; however, the change in the
estimates was very small. Thus, although our measures of preferences and ability to navigate the
system were associated with expenditures, they did not account for an appreciable share of the




















Managed care enrollment among elderly Medicare beneficiaries increased dramatically 
during the 1980s and 1990s, from 3.5 percent of beneficiaries in 1985 to 16 percent in 2000 
(CMS, 2002).  The number of Medicare managed care enrollees has declined in recent years due 
to plan withdrawals from the Medicare+Choice market.  Nonetheless, more than 5 million older 
Americans are currently enrolled in Medicare managed care plans.   
Because managed care plans use financial incentives and administrative rules to limit 
utilization (e.g., Gold et al., 1995), policy makers have been concerned that Medicare managed 
care enrollees face barriers to receiving appropriate care.  Several studies have shown that 
medical care utilization is lower among Medicare managed care enrollees compared to 
beneficiaries in the traditional Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) program (Manning et al., 1984; 
Miller and Luft, 1994, 1997; Chernew 1995), although rates of preventive services are higher in 
managed care (Tudor et al. 1998; Greene et al. 2001). Medicare beneficiaries with low 
socioeconomic status (SES) may be especially likely to face barriers to care under managed care 
(PPRC, 1996). However, there is little research on the role of SES in medical care utilization or 
expenditures among seniors in managed care.  
Studies of the Medicare FFS program have found that seniors with low SES utilize 
medical care services less frequently than those with higher SES (e.g., Gornick, 1996; Mutchler 
and Burr, 1991; Hoenig et al., 1996; Escarce and Puffer, 1997; Miller et al., 1997).  For example, 
Escarce and Puffer (1997) found sizable effects of household income and education on medical 
care expenditures and physician visits. Other studies found similar income and education effects 
on physician visits (Mutchler and Burr, 1991; Miller et al., 1997; Blustein and Weiss, 1998), and 
more pronounced effects for specialist physician visits (Blustein and Weiss, 1998).   3 
However, the applicability of this research to managed care may be limited by differences 
between the managed care and FFS environments that may modify the influence of SES on use.  
Under FFS Medicare providers have little incentive to constrain utilization, whereas in managed 
care settings providers are motivated to impose impediments to care.  Because beneficiaries must 
learn to navigate the managed care system in order to overcome these impediments, education or 
the ability to learn may be more important in managed care than in FFS Medicare.  On the other 
hand, financial barriers to care may be reduced in managed care, rendering financial resources 
less important.  
The few studies that have examined the relationship between SES and medical care 
utilization in Medicare managed care have focused on preventive care.  A national study of 
quality of care in Medicare managed care plans using HEDIS data found disparities in breast 
cancer screening by race, education, and income (Schneider et al., 2002).  In another study based 
on the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, Schneider et al. (2001) found that white 
beneficiaries were more likely than blacks to receive influenza vaccinations, and that there was 
no difference in the magnitude of the disparity in Medicare managed care plans compared with 
FFS Medicare.
  In a study of Medicare managed care enrollees in four U.S. cities, Scott et al. 
(2002) found that black enrollees and enrollees with inadequate health literacy were less likely 
than their white and more literate counterparts ever to have received an influenza vaccination.  
This paper contributes to the limited literature on the role of SES in Medicare managed 
care by examining the effects of SES on medical care expenditures in two Medicare managed 
care plans.  Our study goes beyond previous research in three ways.  First, we incorporate a 
comprehensive set of SES measures including household income, wealth, and educational 
attainment. Second, we fully characterize the role of SES in medical care expenditures by 4 
separately modeling various components of expenditures.  Third, we attempt to assess the roles 
of the most likely pathways by which SES may affect utilization and expenditures. 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
We consider the effect of SES on the use of medical care by elderly persons in managed 
care plans in the context of the standard health production function model (Grossman, 1972).  In 
this model, medical care is valued because it produces improvements in health, and the demand 
for medical care derives from the demand for health.  The health production function translates 
the use of medical care services into improvements in health.   
Within this framework, there are at least three pathways through which SES can affect 
medical care expenditures by Medicare managed care enrollees.  First, SES may influence 
preferences for health and medical care versus the consumption of other goods and services, 
thereby affecting the demand for care.  For instance, persons of low SES may have learned 
behaviors with respect to seeking care that are developed over a lifetime of limited access to the 
medical care system and manifest themselves as differences in preferences.  Alternatively, 
persons with low SES may be less likely to be adequately informed about the benefits of good 
health or good medical care, and hence may have a lower demand for care (Scott et al., 2002). 
SES may also affect preferences for the type of medical care; for example, better educated 
persons may prefer receiving care from a specialist rather than a generalist. 
Second, SES may affect the ability to navigate the managed care system to obtain the 
desired level of medical care.  In the standard Grossman (1972) model, there are no supply-side 
constraints on the medical services patients receive.  However, managed care settings are 
designed to control utilization through supply-side constraints, including restricting the network 5 
of providers, requiring the use of gatekeepers and utilization management (Gold et al., 1995).  In 
such settings, patients may be unable to obtain the services they desire due to barriers erected by 
managed care plans (e.g., financial and nonfinancial incentives to providers, administrative 
hassles, etc.) and managed care enrollees who are more adept at navigating the system may be 
more likely to obtain the care they desire. The ability to navigate around these barriers may be 
related to SES (Scott et al., 2002); for instance, persons with higher educational attainment may 
be more adept in obtaining preauthorization for desired services or referrals to specialists.  
Third, SES may affect utilization through the ability to pay for services.  In managed care 
settings where cost sharing is low, however, ability to pay is likely to be less important than 
other factors. 
Whereas the first pathway applies to both the managed care and FFS settings, the second 
and third pathways are most likely to generate differences between FFS and managed care with 
regard to SES effects on medical care expenditures.  Ability to navigate the system, for example, 
may be more important in managed care than in FFS.  On the other hand, managed care may help 
to blunt SES differences in medical care expenditures if the coordination of care through a 
primary care physician (PCP) that is typical of managed care reduces access barriers and 
informational asymmetries for individuals with low SES (Ettner, 1999; Williams et al., 2001; 
Sarver et al., 2002). Managed care may also allocate services more efficiently through utilization 
management and utilization guidelines, thus narrowing the SES gap in expenditures.  On net, the 
effects of SES on medical care expenditures in managed care are ambiguous, and depend on the 
main pathways underlying these effects and on the extent to which managed care features 
exacerbate or blunt them.  Therefore, the effects of SES on expenditures must be empirically 




Both health plans in this study have Medicare risk contracts and participate in the 
Medicare+Choice program. Both plans are independent practice association (IPA)-model HMOs 
that contract with health care providers in their communities to create provider networks.  One 
plan is located in a Northeastern metropolitan area, the other in the Midwest.  Enrollees in both 
plans are required to select a PCP; however, enrollees in the Northeastern plan are required to 
obtain PCP referrals for specialty care, whereas enrollees in the Midwestern plan are not required 
to do so.  At the time of the study, the copayment for an office visit was $15 in the Northeast 
plan and $10 in the Midwest plan. Other benefits were similar in both plans, and both provided 
limited coverage for prescription drugs.
1 Both plans pay PCP and specialist physicians 
discounted fee-for-service, and PCPs face no financial incentives to limit referrals. 
 
Subjects 
  The target population for our study consisted of 20,227 aged Medicare beneficiaries (i.e., 
65 years or older) enrolled in the two study plans.  We used stratified random sampling to 
increase the number of low-income enrollees in the study sample.  For each study plan, one 
                                                 
1 Both plans had zero premiums, a 20 percent outpatient hospital coinsurance, and a $50 co-payment for emergency 
room visits, which were waived if the patient was admitted to the hospital. In the Midwest plan, the inpatient 
copayment was $350 per admission to a maximum of $700 annually. In the Northeast plan, the inpatient copayment 
was $75 per day to a maximum of $750 annually. 7 
stratum consisted of enrollees who were dually eligible for Medicaid in addition to Medicare.  
The remaining enrollees in each plan were assigned to a low-income stratum if they resided in a 
zip code where the majority of households had incomes less than twice the federal poverty line, 
according to the 1990 census, and to a high-income stratum otherwise.   
  We oversampled dually eligible enrollees and enrollees in the low-income strata, 
choosing sampling probabilities to obtain roughly equal numbers of enrollees from each plan.  
The resulting sample consisted of 6,996 enrollees, including 942 dually eligible enrollees, 700 
enrollees in low-income zip codes, and 5,354 enrollees in high-income zip codes 
 
Data Sources 
The data sources for the study were administrative files from the study plans and a 
telephone survey of plan enrollees.  The administrative data consisted of enrollment files, 
provider claims and facility claims for all services provided to enrollees in the initial study 
sample between April 1, 2000 and October 31, 2001.  Enrollment files from the study plans were 
used to obtain each person's dates of enrollment, age, sex, and dual eligibility for Medicaid.  
Facility claims files were used to identify services provided by institutional providers, including 
hospitals, ambulatory surgery centers, skilled nursing facilities, hospices, laboratories, diagnostic 
imaging centers, home health care providers, and medical equipment providers; the type of 
facility that provided each service; and the payment for each service.  Provider claims files were 
used to identify services provided by physicians and by nonphysician providers, the specialty of 
the physician or type of nonphysician provider who provided each service, and the payment for 
each service. Services were identified using Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) codes (similar to Current Procedural Terminology 8 
[CPT] codes) (AMA, 2000). We did not include prescription drug expenditures in this study 
because of incomplete claims data. 
  The survey included modules on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, health 
status, family and household structure, attitudes and beliefs regarding medical care, current 
experience with medical care, and lifetime experience with health insurance and care.  The 
module on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics elicited information on sex, race and 
ethnicity, educational attainment, household income, and household wealth (Smith, 1997).
2  
Health status was assessed using the Medical Outcomes Study 12-Item Short-Form Health 
Survey (SF-12), which yields summary measures of physical health (Physical Component 
Summary, or PCS) and mental health (Mental Component Summary, or MCS) that range from 0 
to 100, with means of 50 and standard deviations of 10 in the general population (Ware et al., 
1996). Other measures of health status included self-rated general health (excellent, very good, 
good, fair, poor), self-rated memory and ability to make decisions, smoking history, and medical 
conditions and symptoms. The module on family and household structure elicited information on 
marital status, number and sex of children and number living in the household, and whether the 
enrollee lived with a spouse or partner. 
  The module on attitudes and beliefs used a 3-item scale to assess respondents’ perceived 
“health locus of control,” a construct from social learning theory that refers to whether health and 
health outcomes are under respondents’ personal control or the control of medical care providers 
(Lau and Ware, 1981; Marshall et al., 1990). Each item was scored from 1 to 3, with higher 
scores reflecting a stronger belief in the efficacy of self-care versus formal medical care.  We 
constructed a summary score by adding the scores from the 3 items in this module.  
                                                 
2 Wealth was calculated as the sum of the current worth of the following assets: real estate; checking and savings 
accounts; certificates of deposits, government savings bonds, and treasury bills; Individual Retirement Accounts and 
Keogh plans; and stocks and mutual funds. 9 
The module on current experience with medical care included questions on how easily 
respondents were able to make appointments, contact providers, and obtain referrals.   
The module on lifetime experience with health insurance and medical care elicited 
information on respondents’ cumulative years of insurance coverage before Medicare (i.e., 
between 18 and 64 years of age), whether they had a usual source of medical care before 
Medicare (and the type of usual source), and whether they ever belonged to a health maintenance 
organization (HMO) before their current enrollment in a study plan. 
   The survey was conducted between April and October of 2000.  A total of 528 enrollees 
in the initial study sample were ineligible because they were no longer enrolled in a study plan 
when they were contacted.  Of the remaining 6,468 enrollees, 4,600 completed the survey for a 
71 percent response rate. 
 
Variables  
Medical care expenditures were defined as the sum of all paid amounts reported in the 
provider and facility claims in the year following the survey administration for each respondent. 
Expenditures included plan payments and patient out-of-pocket payments. However, patient out-
of-pocket expenditures on non-covered services were excluded from medical care expenditures 
because we did not have claims data for these services.   
We decomposed total medical care expenditures into 4 categories by type or location of 
service: (1) expenditures for physician services at any location, including inpatient, office-based 
settings, clinics, or other outpatient settings; (2) expenditures for inpatient hospital stays, 
excluding physician fees; (3) expenditures for outpatient hospital services, excluding physician 
fees; and (4) expenditures for all other services, including services rendered by nonphysician 10 
providers (e.g., chiropractors, optometrists, podiatrists, and physical therapists), home health care 
services, medical equipment and other medical services and supplies, ambulance services, and 
others. We further disaggregated expenditures for physician services into expenditures for 
primary care physician services and for specialist services.
3 
 The key SES variables in our analysis consisted of three categories of educational 
attainment (less than high school, high school graduate, any college); four categories of 
household income based on percent of the federal poverty level (<100 percent of poverty, 100-
200 percent, 200-400 percent,  >400 percent); and three categories of household wealth based on 




th percentile).  (We explored finer divisions of the SES variables, but 
found that the new adjacent categories this created had similar effects on expenditures.) 
Additional enrollee characteristics used in the study included indicator variables for five 
age categories (65-69, 70-74, 75-79, 80-84, ￿85); an indicator variable for female sex; three 
categories of race or ethnicity (non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black,  “other”); and four 
marital status categories (married, widowed, divorced or separated, never married).  Health status 
was measured by the PCS and MCS scores, self- rated general health, whether the enrollee had 
ever smoked, whether the enrollee died during the study period, and a full set of medical 
condition indicators.
4 All models also included indicator variables for whether a proxy 
respondent was used during the interview, for whether the enrollee was dually eligible for 
Medicaid, and for the Northeast plan. 
                                                 
3 Specialist categories included allergist, dermatologist, neurologist, neurosurgeon, opthalmologist, orthopedist, 
otolaryngologist, plastic surgeon, colon and rectal surgeon, psychiatrist, general surgeon, thoracic surgeon, urologist, 
cardiologist, gastroenterologist, hematologist, nephrologist, rheumatologist, endocrinologist, oncologist, vascular 
surgeon, pulmonologist, infectious disease specialist, neonatologist, and rehabilitation medicine. 
4 Medical condition indicators included in the analysis were high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, lung disease, 
heart attack, congestive heart failure, angina, stroke, arthritis, ulcers, bowel disease, glaucoma, and depression. In 
addition, we included an indicator variable for unexplained weight loss. 11 
We also constructed several variables to assess the most likely pathways through which 
SES may affect medical care expenditures under managed care:  preferences and ability to 
navigate the managed care system.  We measured preferences for medical care by enrollees’ 
attitudes and beliefs regarding care, using the 3-item summary score described earlier.  Other 
proxy variables for preferences captured aspects of enrollees’ lifetime experiences with the 
medical care system that could have shaped their care-seeking behavior, including health 
insurance coverage before Medicare, having had a usual source of care before Medicare, and the 
type of usual source of care before Medicare (e.g., doctor’s office, clinic, hospital, etc.)  
We measured enrollees’ ability to navigate the managed care system by their reported 
ease of making an appointment, ease of contacting a provider, and whether they were able to 
obtain needed referrals to specialists. Additional variables to assess this pathway included 
whether enrollees had belonged to an HMO before enrolling in the study plan, which could have 
enabled them to become familiar with how managed care works; enrollees’ memory and ability 
to make decisions; number of children; and whether enrollees lived alone.
5  Children as well as a 
spouse or partner could help enrollees make appointments, make requests from providers, and 
understand and interpret plan rules, among other things.   
We recognize that these measures are not a comprehensive set of all pathway variables, 
and that each measure may conceivably operate through more than one pathway.  For example, 
belonging to an HMO may not only help enrollees learn how to navigate the system, but may 
shape their preferences for care as well.  Nonetheless, we assumed that these measures would 
provide some insight into the mechanisms underlying SES effects on expenditures. 
                                                 
5 Living with a family member could also affect utilization because the family member may serve as a source of 
informal care. 12 
 
Regression Analyses 
  To assess the effect of SES on medical care expenditures, we conducted multivariate 
regression analyses with expenditures in each of the 4 categories discussed earlier as dependent 
variables.  For each category of expenditures, we estimated two sets of regression models. The 
first set of models estimated the effect of SES on medical care expenditures, adjusting for age, 
sex, marital status, race, health status, dual Medicaid eligibility, proxy status, and study plan as 
covariates.  These models are similar to those used in earlier studies of SES and medical care 
utilization or expenditures (e.g., Escarce and Puffer, 1997; Miller et al., 1997).  However, we 
also estimated a second set of models in which we added the pathway variables  as covariates to 
assess whether the pathways accounted for the effects of SES. 
  Multivariate analyses for expenditures for inpatient and outpatient hospital stays were 
based on the two-part model of medical care utilization (Manning et al., 1981, 1987; Blough et 
al., 1999).  The first part of the two-part model is an equation for whether a person has nonzero 
expenditures in a particular category during the year, and was specified as a probit model.  The 
second part of the two-part model is an equation for the level of expenditures in the particular 
category conditional on nonzero expenditures, and was specified as a generalized linear model 
with a logarithmic link function and variance proportional to the square of the mean (McCullagh 
and Nelder, 1989; Blough et al., 1999; Manning and Mullahy, 2001).   
Multivariate analyses for physician services expenditures and expenditures for other 
services were based on a one-part model for the level of expenditures. Ninety-six percent of 
enrollees had physician expenditures and 90 percent had other expenditures; therefore, the one-
part model was the more suitable model for these components. The one-part model was specified 13 
as a generalized linear model with a logarithmic link function and with variance proportional to 
the square of the mean.  (Using two-part models for physician services expenditures and other 
expenditures gave similar results, but the estimates were less precise.) 
  All analyses were estimated using weights that reflected both the sample design and 
survey nonresponse.  
 
Simulations 
  We used simulations to obtain the predicted annual expenditures per person, in each 
category of expenditures, for each SES category, adjusted for other factors that may affect 
medical care expenditures and that were included as explanatory variables in the models.  Each 
simulation for the estimates based on two-part models was conducted in three steps. 
  First, we used the estimated coefficients from the first part of the two-part model to 
predict the probability of nonzero expenditures for each person i, E[pi (Expi > 0)], for each SES 
category, by substituting the person's covariate values and alternately switching each indicator 
variable for SES category on and off.  Similarly, we used the estimated coefficients from the 
second part of the two-part model to predict conditional expenditures (i.e., conditional on 
nonzero spending) for person i, E(Expi | Expi > 0), for each SES category.  
Second, we predicted unconditional expenditures for person i, E(Expi) for each SES 
category, as:  
E( Expi ) = E[pi  (Expi > 0)] x E( Expi | Expi > 0). 
Third, for each SES category, we averaged the individual predictions of unconditional 
expenditures across all the persons in the study sample.  We used the delta method (Bishop et al., 14 
1975) to derive the standard errors of the predicted annual expenditures per person and the 
statistical tests of differences in expenditures across the SES categories. 
  Analogously, each simulation for the estimates based on one-part models was conducted 
in two steps. First, we used the estimated coefficients from the model to predict expenditures for 
person i, E(Expi), for each SES category, by substituting the person's covariate values and 
alternately switching each indicator variable for SES category on and off.  Second, we averaged 
the individual predictions of unconditional expenditures across all the persons in the study 
sample and used the delta method to derive standard errors for these estimates. 
  We obtained predicted annual total medical care expenditures per person, for each of the 
SES categories, by summing the predicted expenditures across the 4 categories of expenditures.  
Standard errors of predicted total expenditures per person and statistical tests of differences in 
total expenditures across SES categories were obtained using a bootstrapping technique (Efron, 
1982).  The paper presents the findings of the simulations.  Full regression results are available 





Total medical care expenditures averaged $5200, with inpatient hospital expenditures 
accounting for 41 percent ($2131), physician expenditures for 28 percent ($1471), outpatient 
hospital expenditures for 12 percent ($622), and expenditures on the other services for 19 percent 
($976). 15 
Table 1 presents descriptive data on SES and other sample characteristics. All statistics 
are weighted using sampling weights. Thirty-eight percent of the sample had less than a high 
school education, while 25 percent had some college education. By definition, one-third of the 
sample fell in each household wealth tertile. Eleven percent of the sample had household 
incomes below the poverty line, 44 percent of the sample was low-income (100-200 percent of 
poverty), and 13 percent was high-income (400 percent of poverty and higher).  
Table 2 presents means of the pathway variables.  Many of these variables were 
significantly associated with the measures of SES (data not shown).  Thus higher income 
enrollees had stronger beliefs in the efficacy of formal medical care than their lower income 
counterparts.  Higher educational attainment, household wealth, and household income were 
positively associated with having health insurance coverage, having HMO experience, and 
having a usual source of care, especially a doctor’s office or clinic, before Medicare.  For 
instance, only 72 percent of poor enrollees had a usual source of care between the ages of 18 and 
64, compared with 92 percent of high-income enrollees. Sixty four percent of individuals in the 
top tertile of assets were insured all the time during age 18 to 64 compared with 47 percent in the 
bottom tertile. Enrollees with higher education also found making an appointment with a 
provider easier:  26 percent of enrollees with a high school degree reported that they found 
making an appointment very easy compared with 29 percent of enrollees with a college degree. 
Higher educational attainment, household wealth, and household income were associated 
with better self-rated memory and ability to make decisions. For example, 15 percent of 
individuals with less than a high school degree rated their memory as excellent compared to 21 
percent of individuals with a college degree.  Conversely, low-income and less educated 
enrollees were more likely than their high-income peers to be living alone and to be dually 16 
eligible for Medicaid.  Forty three percent of individuals with less than a high school degree 
were living alone compared with 37 percent of individuals with a college degree. The number of 




Effects of SES on Expenditures 
 
Table 3 reports predicted annual medical care expenditures, by expenditure category and 
SES, adjusted for differences in the covariates.  The analyses revealed that higher educational 
attainment increased physician services expenditures. Enrollees with less than high school 
education had lower physician expenditures than enrollees with a high school degree or some 
college.  However, the differences in physician expenditures by education did not result in 
statistically significant differences in total medical expenditures by educational attainment. 
  Household income had a large effect on medical care expenditures. Specifically, poor 
enrollees had substantially higher total medical expenditures than low-income or middle-income 
enrollees, and this effect was entirely due to inpatient hospital expenditures. The opposite pattern 
was found for expenditures for other services, where the poor had lower expenditures than all 
other income categories.  Income had no effect on physician services expenditures. 
  The effect of household wealth on medical expenditures was mixed. Enrollees with high 
assets had higher total medical care expenditure than enrollees with medium assets. In addition, 
enrollees with high assets had higher physician services expenditures than enrollees with low or 
medium assets. For outpatient hospital expenditures and expenditures for other services, 
however, enrollees with low assets had higher expenditures than enrollees with medium assets.  
  Table 4 reports predicted expenditures by SES for two components of physician 
expenditures:  expenditures for PCP services and expenditures for specialist services. 17 
Disaggregating physician services expenditures into these components revealed that the effects 
of SES observed in Table 2 were driven by specialist expenditures. In particular, enrollees with 
less than high school education had lower expenditures for specialist services than high school 
graduates and enrollees with some college, whereas we found no education differences for PCP 
services.  Similarly, enrollees with high assets had higher specialist expenditures than enrollees 
with low or medium assets, but we found the opposite pattern for PCP expenditures.  Enrollees 
with low assets had higher PCP expenditures than enrollees with medium assets, although the 
magnitude of the difference was small. 
The effects of the covariates included in the first set of analyses are reported in the 
Appendix.  In general, these variables had the expected effects on expenditures.   
 
The Pathway Variables and Expenditures 
In our second set of analyses, we reestimated the expenditure models after including the 
pathway variables as additional covariates.  We found that our measures of preferences for 
medical care were significantly associated with medical care expenditures (Table 5). Thus a 
weaker belief in the efficacy of formal medical care, as quantified by a decrease in the care 
attitudes summary score from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile of the distribution in the sample, was 
associated with a $685 decrease in total medical care expenditures. Enrollees who were insured 
only some or none of the time between the ages of 18 and 64 spent $1,034 more on medical care 
than enrollees who were insured most or all of the time. Enrollees whose usual source of care 
between the ages of 18 and 64 was a hospital or emergency room incurred expenditures for other 
services that were $231 higher than enrollees with no usual source of care.   
Several of our measures of ability to navigate the managed care system were also 
significantly associated with medical care expenditures (Table 5).  Enrollees who reported that 18 
getting appointments with providers was easy had total expenditures that were $698 higher than 
enrollees who reported difficulty getting appointments.  Enrollees with 1 to 10 years of HMO 
experience had total expenditures that were $902 higher than enrollees with no HMO experience, 
although, curiously, enrollees with more than 10 years of HMO experience had expenditures 
similar to those with no experience.  Enrollees who reported poor decision-making skills had 
total medical expenditures that were $362 lower than enrollees who reported good decision-
making skills.  
The effect of the pathway variables was not restricted to particular components of 
medical expenditures.  Even inpatient use, which arguably should be the least responsive to 
preferences and accessibility, was significantly associated with care attitudes, ease of making an 
appointment, HMO experience, and decision-making skills.  Other pathway variables such as 
number of children, ease of contacting providers and self-rated memory obtaining referrals were 
not significant in the models, and were dropped from the final specifications.
6 
 
The Pathway Variables and SES Effects on Expenditures 
Despite the fact that many of the pathway variables were associated with expenditures, 
including the pathway variables in the regression models did not appreciably narrow the SES 
differences in Table 3.  To illustrate, Table 6 presents ratios of predicted expenditures for 
different SES categories derived from models with and without the pathway variables.  For 
instance, without adjusting for pathway variables, the ratio of total medical expenditures for 
individuals with a high school degree relative to individuals without a high school degree was 
                                                 
6 Although unrelated to the pathways we assessed, we also examined whether owning a car was associated with 
medical care expenditures, since car ownership was associated with SES.  However, car ownership was not 
significant in the models. 
 19 
1.09 (Table 6). This ratio narrowed to 1.06 when we included the pathway variables. The results 
in the table indicate that the pathway variables explained a small share of the educational 
differences in medical care expenditures; however, these variables explained none of the 
expenditure differences based on household income or wealth. 
  
DISCUSSION 
  This study examined the role of SES in medical care expenditures in two 
Medicare+Choice managed care plans.  Our analyses found several significant effects of SES on 
expenditures.  Additionally, we found that the impact of SES on expenditures varied according to 
the category of expenditures, substantiating the need for modeling the components of medical 
care expenditures separately. 
We found that higher educational attainment and higher assets increased physician 
services expenditures, particularly expenditures on specialist services, and that higher assets 
increased total medical care expenditures as well.  However, the effect of assets on outpatient 
expenditures and expenditures for other services was mixed.  We also found that poor enrollees 
had substantially higher inpatient hospital expenditures and, as a result, higher total expenditures 
than nonpoor enrollees. 
A possible mechanism for our finding that higher educational attainment increased 
specialist expenditures is that education may lead to a greater understanding of the benefits of 
specialist care.  Alternatively, more highly educated enrollees may be better able to navigate the 
managed care system in order to obtain specialist referrals. It is also possible that physicians treat 
highly educated patients differently, regardless of managed care, and are more likely to satisfy 20 
these patients’ requests for referrals or to believe that these patients are more capable of adhering 
to complex treatment regimens  (e.g., Goldman and Smith, 2002). 
Our finding that poor enrollees had substantially higher inpatient hospital expenditures 
than the nonpoor, even after adjusting for health status, is consistent with earlier research on both 
Medicare and non-Medicare populations showing that people with low SES have higher hospital 
use (Epstein et al. 1988; Epstein et al., 1990). The poor may prefer inpatient care, or their 
physicians may be more likely to admit them for inpatient care, if they have less support than the 
nonpoor for treatment and recovery at home.  If the poor are more likely than the nonpoor to 
delay ambulatory care, they may develop more severe health conditions that require inpatient 
admission more frequently.  Notably, Stern et al. (1991) found that low-income patients were 
more likely than their higher income counterparts to be admitted to hospitals through the 
emergency department.  The poor may also have worse health status than the nonpoor in ways 
that were not captured by our health status measures.  However, unobserved differences in health 
status would be expected to affect expenditures in all categories.   
Our finding that higher assets increased physician services expenditures and total 
expenditures is consistent with previous studies that found positive effects of financial resources 
on physician visits and medical care expenditures (Escarce and Puffer, 1997; Mutchler and Burr, 
1991; Miller, 1997; Blustein and Weiss, 1998).  Earlier studies have used income as the sole 
measure of financial resources.  Since wealth is a better indicator than income of financial 
resources among the elderly (Smith, 1997), however, it is not surprising to find a positive effect 
of wealth on expenditures without an effect of income.  On the other hand, given the low level of 
cost sharing in the two study plans, wealth effects on expenditures may reflect differences in 
preferences for medical care rather than financial resources.  If wealthier people have developed 21 
preferences for higher quality or “luxury” goods, these preferences may translate into medical 
care as well.  Our finding that higher assets increased specialist expenditures is consistent with 
this interpretation.  It is also possible that physicians treat wealthier patients differently and are 
more likely to refer these patients to specialists.   
Notably, the effects of SES on medical care expenditures in this study were modest in 
size.  In fact, these effects were smaller, or even opposite in direction, when compared with the 
SES effects observed in previous studies of FFS Medicare.  For example, using 1987 data for a 
nationally representative sample of Medicare beneficiaries, Escarce and Puffer (1997) found that 
total medical care expenditures for high-income seniors were 24 percent higher than 
expenditures for poor seniors.  In the current study, poor enrollees had the highest total 
expenditures, and expenditures did not differ across the other income categories.  Similarly, 
Escarce and Puffer (1997) found that total expenditures for beneficiaries with some college were 
23 percent higher and for high school graduates 13 percent higher than expenditures for 
beneficiaries who did not have a high school degree.  The current study found corresponding 
differences in total expenditures of 13 percent and 9 percent, respectively.   
It is possible that features of the Medicare managed care plans in this study contributed to 
blunting SES differences in expenditures.  The study plans did not have financial incentives for 
providers to limit referrals and required all enrollees to select a PCP.  Having a PCP may foster 
regular patient-provider relationships, which may reduce access barriers and promote use of 
needed services, especially by low-income people (e.g., Scott et al., 2002).  Consistent with this 
notion, SES was unrelated to enrollees’ reported ease of getting appointments, contacting 
providers, or obtaining referrals.  22 
  Unfortunately, our exploration of the pathways through which SES affects medical care 
expenditures met with limited success. Although attitudes and beliefs regarding medical care, 
history of health insurance coverage, usual source of care before Medicare, ease of making an 
appointment, HMO experience, and decision-making skills were significantly associated with 
expenditures, including these variables in the regression models did not appreciably narrow the 
SES effects.  Thus, while our findings suggest that preferences and ability to navigate the system 
influence spending, we were unable to uncover evidence that these are the main pathways 
underlying the effects of SES.  
Our study has several limitations.  First, we examined the experience of seniors from only 
two HMOs; therefore, our findings may not be generalizable across health plans and areas of the 
country. Second, although our measures of health status were comprehensive, unobserved 
differences in health status may have influenced our results.  For example, we had no 
information on the severity of medical conditions.  Third, as a result of incomplete pharmacy 
claims, we could not assess the impact of SES on prescription drug expenditures.   
Finally, our ability to determine the role of alternative pathways may have been 
undermined by the fact that our pathway measures were limited. Thus, for instance, while we had 
a measure of beliefs in the efficacy of formal medical care, we had no direct measures of 
preferences or habits regarding the consumption of higher quality or “luxury” goods. Similarly, 
we used information on household and family structure, rather than direct measures, to assess 
support at home, and we had no measures of health knowledge, ability to comply with medical 
regimens, or treatment decisions by medical care providers. 
 23 
Despite these limitations, this study makes an important contribution to our 
understanding of the impact of SES on medical care expenditures in Medicare managed care. In 
particular, our results show a smaller effect of SES on medical expenditures in Medicare 
managed care compared with the effects in the existing literature based on traditional FFS 
Medicare.  Coordination of care by PCPs, utilization management, use of practice guidelines and 
other quality assurance mechanisms, and other features of managed care plans may have helped 
attenuate SES disparities.  If our findings are generalizable to other Medicare managed care 
plans, this would provide strong evidence for managed care as an instrument to foster equity in 
health care delivery (Chen and Escarce, 2004).   
However, our study also suggests that research is needed to explore further the pathways 
or mechanisms by which SES affects medical care utilization, because developing effective 
policy interventions requires such an understanding.  Better and more comprehensive measures 
of preferences, ability to navigate the system, health knowledge, and other potential pathways 
could be very fruitful in this regard. 24 
REFERENCES 
 
American Medical Association.  2000.  Physicians’ Current Procedural Terminology.  Chicago, 
IL: American Medical Association. 
 
Blough, D.K., C.W. Madden, and M.C. Hornbrook.  1999.  Modeling risk using generalized 
linear models.  Journal of Health Economics 18:153-171. 
 
Blustein, J., and L.J. Weiss. 1998.  Visits to specialists under Medicare: socioeconomic 
advantage and access to care.  Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved.  9(2):153-
69. 
 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services.  2002.  Program information on Medicare, Medicaid, 
SCHIP and other programs of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services.  Available online: 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/charts/series/sec2.pdf.  Accessed November 26, 2002.   
 
Chen, A.Y., and J.J. Escarce.  2004.  Quantifying income-related inequality in health care 
delivery in the United States.  Medical Care 42(1):  38-47. 
 
Chernew, M.  1995.  HMO use of diagnostic tests: a review of the evidence. Medical Care 
Research and Review 52:196-222. 
 
Efron, B.  1982.  The Jackknife, the Bootstrap, and Other Resampling Plans.  Philadelphia, PA: 
Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics. 
 
Epstein, A.M., R.S. Stern, and J. Tognetti et al.  1988.  Association of patients’ SES with the 
length of hospital stay and hospital charges within diagnosis-related groups. New England 
Journal of Medicine 318(24):1579-1585. 
 
Epstein, A.M., R.S. Stern, and J.S. Weissman.  1990.  Do the poor cost more? A multihospital 
study of patients' socioeconomic status and use of hospital resources.  New England Journal of 
Medicine. 322(16):1122-8.   
 
Escarce, J.J., and F.W. Puffer.  1997.  Black-white differences in the use of medical care by the 
elderly: a contemporary analysis. In: Martin LG, Soldo BJ (eds). Racial and Ethnic Differences 
in the Health of Older Americans.  Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press; 183-209. 
 
Ettner, S.L.  1999.  The relationship between continuity of care and the health behaviors of 
patients: does having a usual physician make a difference?  Medical Care 37(6):547-55. 
 
Gold, M.R., R. Hurley, and T. Lake et al.  1995.  A national survey of the arrangements managed 
care plans make with physicians. New England Journal of Medicine 333:1678-1683. 
 
Goldman, D.P., and J.P. Smith. 2002.  Can patient self-management help explain the SES health 
gradient? Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 99(16): 10929-34. 25 
 
Gornick, M.E., P.W. Eggers, and T.W. Reilly et al.  1996.  Effects of race and income on 
mortality and use of services among Medicare beneficiaries. New England Journal of Medicine 
335:791-799. 
 
Grossman, M.  1972.  On the concept of health capital and the demand for health.  Journal of 
Political Economy 80:223-255. 
 
Greene, J., J. Blustein, and K.A.Laflamme. 2001. Use of Preventive Care Services, Beneficiary 
Characteristics, and Medicare HMO Performance. Health Care Financing Review 22(4):141-53.  
 
Hoenig, H., L. Rubenstein, and K. Kahn.  1996.  Rehabilitation after hip fracture: equal 
opportunity for all?  Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation 77(1):58-63. 
 
Hu, P., and D.B. Reuben.  2002.  Effects of managed care on the length of time that elderly 
patients spend with physicians during ambulatory visits: National Ambulatory Medical Care 
Survey.  Medical Care. 40(7):606-13.   
 
Lau, R.R., and J.E. Ware.  1981.  Refinements in the measurement in health-specific locus-of-
control beliefs. Medical Care 19:1147-1157. 
 
Manning, W.G., and J. Mullahy.  2001.  Estimating log models: to transform or not to transform?  
Journal of Health Economics 20:461-494. 
 
Manning, W.G., C.N. Morris, and J.P. Newhouse, et al. 1981.  A two-part model of the demand 
for medical care: preliminary results from the Health Insurance Study.  In: van der Gaag J, 
Perlman M, eds.  Health, Economics, and Health Economics. Amsterdam, Holland: North 
Holland: 103-123. 
 
Manning, W.G., A. Leibowitz, and G.A. Goldberg, et al.  1984.  A controlled trial of the effect of 
a prepaid group practice on use of services.  New England Journal of Medicine 310:1505-1510. 
 
Manning, W.G., J.P. Newhouse, N. Duan, E.B. Keeler, A. Leibowitz, and M.S. Marquis.  1987.  
Health insurance and the demand for medical care: evidence from a randomized experiment.  
American Economic Review 77:251-278. 
 
Marshall, G.N., B.E. Collins, V.C. Crooks.  1990.  A comparison of two multidimensional health 
locus of control instruments.  Journal of Personality Assessment 54:181-190. 
 
McCullagh, P., and J.A. Nelder.  1989.  Generalized Linear Models, 2
nd Edition.  London, 
England: Chapman & Hall.   
 
Miller, B., R.T. Campbell, and S. Furner, et al. 1997.  Use of medical care by African American 
and white older persons: comparative analysis of three national data sets. Journal of Gerontology 
(Social Sciences) 52B(6): S325-S335. 
 26 
Miller, R.H., and H.S. Luft. 1997. Does managed care lead to better or worse quality of care? 
Health Affairs 16(5):7-25. 
 
Miller, R.H., and H.S. Luft. 1994. Managed care plan performance since 1980: a literature 
analysis.  Journal of the American Medical Association 271:1512-1519. 
 
Mutchler, J.E., and J.A. Burr.  1991.  Racial differences in health and health care service 
utilization in late life.  Journal of Health and Social Behavior 32(4):342-356. 
 
Physician Payment Review Commission.  1996.  Access to Care in Medicare Managed Care: 
Results from a 1996 Survey of Enrollees and Disenrollees.  Washington, D.C.: PPRC.   
 
Sarver, J.H., R.K. Cydulka, and D.W. Baker. 2002. Usual Source of Care and Nonurgent 
Emergency Department Use. Academic Emergency Medicine 9 (9): 916-23. 
 
Schneider, E.C., P.D. Cleary, A.M. Zaslavsky, and A.M. Epstein.  2001.  Racial disparity in 
influenza vaccination:  does managed care narrow the gap between African Americans and 
whites?  Journal of the American Medical Association 286(12), 1455-60. 
 
Schneider, E.C., A.M. Zaslavsky, A.M. Epstein.  2002.  Racial disparities in the quality of care 
for enrollees in Medicare managed care.  Journal of the American Medical Association 
287(10):1288-94.   
 
Scott, T.L., J.A. Gazmararian, M.V. Williams, and D.W. Baker. 2002.  Health literacy and 
preventive health care use among Medicare enrollees in a managed care organization.  Medical 
Care. 40(5): 395-404. 
 
Smith, J.  1997.  Wealth inequality among older Americans. Journal of Gerontology (Special 
Issue: Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old [AHEAD]: Initial Results from the 
Longitudinal Study) 52B(Special Issue):74-81. 
 
Stern, R.S., J.S. Weissman, and A.M. Epstein.  1991.  The emergency department as a pathway 
to admission for poor and high cost patients.  Journal of the American Medical Association.  
266(16):2238-2243. 
 
Tudor, C.G., G. Riley, and M. Ingber.  1998.  Satisfaction with care: do Medicare HMOs make a 
difference?  Health Affairs. 17(2):165-76.   
 
Ware, J., M. Kosinski, and S.D. Keller.  1996.  A 12-item short-form health survey:  construction 
of scales and preliminary tests of reliability and validity.  Medical Care 34(3), 220-33. 
 
Williams, R.L., S.A. Flocke, and K.C. Stange.  2001.  Race and preventive services delivery 
among black patients and white patients seen in primary care.  Medical Care 39(11):1260-1267. 
 
       27 
TABLE 1: SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
Variable Mean
Education
     Less than high school 38%
     High school graduate 37%
     Some college 25%
Household Income 
     Poor (<100% poverty) 11%
     Low income (100-200% poverty) 44%
     Middle income (200-400% poverty) 32%
     High income (400% and up) 13%
Household Wealth 
     Low assets (1st tertile) 33%
     Medium assets (2nd tertile) 33%
     High assets (3rd tertile) 33%
Age 
     65 to 69 25%
     70 to 74  29%
     75 to 79 23%
     80 to 84 14%
     85 or older 8%
Sex
     Female 56%
     Male 44%
Race/Ethnicity
     White 88%
     Black  7%
     Other 5%
 
Marital Status
     Married 42%
     Widowed 43%
     Divorced/Separated 11%
     Never married 4%
Health Status
     PCS score 44.0
     MCS score 54.4
     Ever smoked 57%
     Self-rated health is Excellent/Very Good 28%
     Self-rated health is Good 41%
     Self-rated health is Fair  27%
     Self-rated health is Poor 4%
     High blood pressure 57%
     Diabetes 17%28 





TABLE 1: SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
Variable Mean
     Cancer 14%
     Lung disease 14%
     Heart attack 13%
     CHF 6%
     Angina 12%
     Stroke 9%
     Arthritis 54%
     Ulcers 12%
     Bowel disease 7%
     Glaucoma 9%
     Depression 11%
     Weight loss 4%
     Died during year 3%
Other
     Proxy status 12%
     Northeast plan  69%
     Dual Medicaid eligibility 4%
Number of Observations  4600




TABLE 2:  MEANS OF PATHWAY VARIABLES 
Variable Mean
Preferences
     Care Attitudes (summary score, range 3-9) 6.0
     Insured (18-64): All or most of the time 84%
     Insured (18-64):Some or none of the time 16%
     Never in HMO 75%
     In HMO less than 10 yrs 12%
     In HMO 10 or more years 13%
     Usual source of care (18-64): doctor/clinic  77%
     Usual source of care (18-64): other  8%
     Usual source of care (18-64): none 15%
Ability to Navigate the System
     Belonged to HMO before study plan  26%
     Ease of appointment (1: very hard, 4: very easy) 3.2
     Ease of contact (1: very hard, 4: very easy) 3.2
     Always got referral when needed 95%
     Self-rated memory (1:excellent, 5: poor) 2.5
     Self-rated decisions (1:excellent, 5: poor) 2.5
     Living alone 57%
     Number of children 2.930 
 
TABLE 3: PREDICTED EXPENDITURES, BY EXPENDITURE CATEGORY AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS
Total Physician Inpatient Outpatient Other
Services Hospital Hospital
Education
Less than high school 4966 1347 A B 2079 578 961
High School 5429 1557 A 2147 680 1045
College          5606 1667 B 2222 595 1123
Household Wealth (tertiles)
Low Assets (1st tertile) 5343 1425 A 2112 704 A 1101 A
Medium Assets (2nd tertile) 4738 A 1370 B 1945 508 A b 915 A
High Assets (3rd tertile) 5835 A 1741 A B 2399 632 b 1063
Household Income (% of Poverty Line)
Poor (<100% poverty) 6459 a b 1495 3440 A B 693 831 a b C
Low Income (100-200% poverty) 5109 a 1508 1988 A 590 1024 a
Middle Income (200-400% poverty) 5050 b 1478 1919 B 605 1048 b
High Income (400% and up) 5700 1533 2251 680 1236 C
Note: Letters show statistical significance between pairs of predictions within an SES category. 
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 5% level; lower case letters indicate significance at the 10% level
For example: The poor have significantly higher total expenditure than the low income and the middle income (at the 10% level)
Multivariate analyses adjust for age, sex, race, marital status, health status (measured by PCS, MCS, self reported health and 
chronic conditions), Medicaid enrollment, plan membership, proxy interview status, and death during the year.
Expenditure Category31 
 
TABLE 4: PREDICTED PHYSICIAN EXPENDITURES, BY TYPE OF PHYSICIAN AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS
Total Primary Care Specialists
Physician Physicians
Education
Less than high school 1347 A B 259 783 A B
High School 1557 A 276 944 B
College    1667 B 283 977 A
Household Wealth (tertiles)
Low Assets (1st tertile) 1425 A 289 A  805 A
Medium Assets (2nd tertile) 1370 B 254 A 831 B
High Assets (3rd tertile) 1741 A B 267 1056 A B
Household Income (% of Poverty Line)
Poor (<100% poverty) 1495 277 842
Low Income (100-200% poverty) 1508 264 905
Middle Income (200-400% poverty) 1478 275 872
High Income (400% and up) 1533 281 916
Note: Letters show statistical significance between pairs of predictions within an SES category. 
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 5% level; lower case letters indicate significance at the 10% level
Multivariate analyses adjust for age, sex, race, marital status, health status (measured by PCS, MCS, self reported health and 





TABLE 5: MARGINAL EFFECTS OF PATHWAY VARIABLES ON MEDICAL CARE EXPENDITURES
Preferences
Care attitudes                                     
(75th-25th percentile) -685 ** -106 ** -384 ** -36   -160 **
Insured some or none of the time 
(compared to all or most of the time) 1034 * 249 ** 485   213 ** 87  
Usual source of care: Dr. Office 
(compared to no source) -303   -148   -106   -58   10  
Usual source of care: Other place 
(compared to no source) 369   82   28   28   231 *
Ability to Navigate the System
Decision-making skills                             
(75th-25th percentile) -362 * -80 ** -226 * -20   -36  
Ease of appointment                         
(75th-25th percentile) 698 ** 203 ** 336 * 18   141 **
Living alone 398   71   120   58   150  
In HMO 1-10 yrs                                       
(compared to 0 yrs) 902 ** 146 * 828 ** -34   -38  
In HMO 10+ yrs                                      
(compared to 0 yrs) -792   -61   -470   -97   -166  
Note: * Denotes significance at 10% level   ** Denotes significance at 5% level
Services Hospital Hospital
Other Total Physician Inpatient Outpatient33 
 
 
TABLE 6: RATIO OF EXPENDITURES, BY SES CATEGORY AND EXPENDITURE TYPE,
  WITH AND WITHOUT ADJUSTING FOR PATHWAY VARIABLES
Pathway Variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Education
Less than high school 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
High School 1.09 1.06 1.16 1.13 1.03 1.00 1.18 1.17 1.09 1.04
College          1.13 1.09 1.24 1.21 1.07 1.01 1.03 1.01 1.17 1.13
Household Income 
Poor (<100% poverty) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Low Income (100-200% poverty) 0.79 0.81 1.01 1.01 0.58 0.61 0.85 0.85 1.23 1.21
Middle Income (200-400% poverty) 0.78 0.82 0.99 1.01 0.56 0.60 0.87 0.88 1.26 1.27
High Income (400% and up) 0.88 0.92 1.03 1.03 0.65 0.72 0.98 0.98 1.49 1.44
Household Wealth (tertiles)
Low Assets (1st tertile) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Medium Assets (2nd tertile) 0.89 0.88 0.96 0.97 0.92 0.90 0.72 0.72 0.83 0.83
High Assets (3rd tertile) 1.09 1.10 1.22 1.21 1.14 1.17 0.90 0.89 0.97 0.97
Note:  Each value in the table is the ratio of predicted expenditures for enrollees in the particular education, income, or wealth category relative
to enrollees in the reference category for that SES variable.  For instance, the reference category for education is less than a high school degree.
The columns labeled "No" are for models that did not include the pathway variables as covariates.  Those labeled "Yes" are for models that
adjusted for the pathway variables.  Multivariate analyses adjust for age, sex, race, marital status, health status (measured by PCS, MCS,
self reported health and chronic conditions), Medicaid enrollment, plan membership, proxy interview status, dual Medicaid eligibility, and death 
during the year.
Services Hospital Hospital
Other Total Physician Inpatient Outpatient34 
 
APPENDIX TABLE: MARGINAL EFFECTS OF COVARIATES ON MEDICAL CARE EXPENDITURES
Marital Status
Widowed 375   158   54   104   59  
Divorced/Separated 71   214   -311   80   87  
Never Married 978   147   607   85   139  
Race
Black  71   -39   35   66   10  
Other -116   73   -202   27   -14  
Health
PCS Score  (75th -25th 
percentile) -2233 ** -376 ** -1030 ** -288 ** -538 **
MCS Score  (75th -25th 
percentile) -147   -63   27   -47   -65  
Ever Smoked 902 ** 231 ** 408   11   252 **
Self-reported health is good 
(omitted category is 
excellent/very good) 195   148 * -83   17   112  
Health is Fair  544   421 ** -164   67   220 *
Health is Poor 1764   582 ** 609   281   291  
High Blood Pressure 513   56   367   104 ** -14  
Diabetes 676   -6   312   54   318 **
Cancer 1802 ** 706 ** 173   152 * 771 **
Lung Disease 946 * -96   937 ** -19   124  
Heart Attack -298   26   -71   -5   -248 **
CHF 1505 * 509 ** 611   193   192  
Angina 1028 * 460 ** 413   19   136  
Stroke 807   55   457   169 * 127  
Arthritis 256   216 ** 44   -28   23  
Ulcers 995   240 * 558   41   156  
Bowel Disease -176   9   -299   95   19  
Glaucoma 168   172   -120   109   7  
Depression 1003 * 327 * 467   132   77  
Weight Loss 3327 ** 406 * 1837 * 316 * 768 *
Demographics
Age: 70 to 74 (omitted category 
is 65 to 69) 413   272 ** -64   94   112  
Age: 75 to 79 294   188 * 66   51   -10  
Age: 80 to 84 2285 ** 466 ** 1099 ** 519 ** 201  
Age: 85 plus 1115 * 207   340   148   419 **
Female -1569 ** -320 ** -1027 ** -181 ** -40  
Died during year 20796 ** 3704 ** 13358 ** 1037 ** 2698 **
Plan Variables
Proxy status -1129 ** -301 ** -532 * -149 ** -147  
Northeast Plan  -20   -37   -305   117 ** 205 **
Medicaid 284 -36 243 13 64
** indicates significance at the 5% level; * indicates significance at the 10% level
Other Total Physician Inpatient Outpatient